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ESSAY
A Procedural Due Process Attack on FDA
Regulations: Getting New Drugs to
People with AIDS
Introduction
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalien-
able Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of
Happiness-That to secure these Rights, Governments are insti-
tuted among Men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent of
the Governed, that whenever any Form of Government becomes
destructive of these Ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or
abolish it.'
"The strongest ills demand the speediest cure."2
"Too late is the medicine prepared when the disease had
gained strength by long delay."3
"For want of timely care, Millions have died of medicable
wounds."4
AIDS, or Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, is a disease
caused by the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV),' which is a new
strain in the family of retroviruses.6 AIDS devastates its human host by
opening it to a variety of rare opportunistic infections, such as pneumo-
nia and cancer.' Because of medical science's virtual ignorance in treat-
1. The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
2. SOPHOCLES, ANTIGONE 1.1324 (c. 441 B.C.).
3. OVID, REMEDIORIUM AMonIs 1.91 (c. 1 B.C.).
4. J. ARMSTRONG, THE ART OF PRESERVING HEALTH, Bk. iii, 1.519 (1744).
5. Grover, AIDS: Keywords, in AIDS: CULTURAL ANALYSIS/CULTURAL ACTIVISM
17, 19 (D. Crimp ed. 1988).
6. Treichler, 4IDS, Homophobia, and Biomedical Discourse: An Epidemic of Significa-
tion, in AIDS: CULTURAL ANALYSIS/CULTURAL ACTIVISM, supra note 5, at 54 n.65.
7. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE & CENTERS
FOR DISEASE CONTROL, AMERICA RESPONDS TO AIDS, AIDS PREVENTION GUIDE, WHAT
Is HIV INFECTION? AND WHAT IS AIDS? (1989).
[417]
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ing retroviruses, AIDS is a fatal disease. Western civilization has not
faced the devastation of such a public health menace since the Black
Plague of the Middle Ages.' At the time of this writing, 115,158 Ameri-
cans have been diagnosed with AIDS,9 68,441 Americans have died,"0
and over 1.5 million Americans have been exposed to HIV.11
To date, no case of AIDS remission has been documented.12 Medi-
cal researchers believe that persons infected with HIV will necessarily
contract AIDS.13 Without expeditious development and dissemination
of effective treatments and therapies, persons with AIDS may expect
from eighteen months to two years of deteriorating health before the dis-
ease proves fatal.1 4
AIDS has presented America with a problem it has heretofore
avoided: a fatal disease infecting the public in epidemic proportions.
Treatments for AIDS are being developed by the private sector. Unfor-
tunately, the speedy dissemination of new lifesaving drugs is being ham-
pered by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The FDA requires
that a new drug be approved according to a specified procedure. One
requisite element of this procedure is the double blind placebo study.15
The drug approval procedure promulgated by the FDA can require up to
twelve years to complete.1 6
Piqued at what they believe to be governmental foot dragging and
governmental coercion of people with AIDS (PWAs)17 to wager their
8. Treichler, supra note 6, at 63.
9. Telephone interview with National AIDS Hotline (Jan. 19, 1990) (statistics as of Nov.
30, 1989); see infra note 176.
10. Id.
11. Id
12. Grover, supra note 5, at 21; Treichler, supra note 6, at 32.
13. E. NICHOLS, MoBILIzING AGAINST AIDS (1989); Lipson, A Crisis in Insurance, in
THE AIDS EPIDEMIC: PUVATE RIGHTS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 285, 289 (P. O'Malley
ed. 1989) (research suggests that AIDS may kill 99.9% of those who are exposed to HIV).
14. S. GREGORY & B. LEONARDO, CONQUERING AIDS Now! 180 (1986); Comment,
The Right of Privacy in Choosing Medical Treatment: Should Terminally Ill Persons Have
Access to Drugs Not Yet Approved by the Food and Drug Administration?, 20 J. MARSHALL L.
REv. 693 (1987).
15. In placebo-controlled drug studies, a placebo is given to one group of patients, while
the drug being tested is give to another group. The results obtained in the two groups are then
compared. Glossary, BETA, Nov. 1989, at 27 (BETA is a publication of the San Francisco
AIDS Foundation) In double blind placebo studies, neither the investigator nor the patient
knows who is getting which therapy; see infra note 38 and accompanying text.
16. J. BOHNE, T. CUNNINGHAM, J. ENGBRETSON, K. FORNATARO & M. HARRINGTON,
TREATMENT DECISIONS 46-50 (1989) [hereinafter TREATMENT DECISIONS]. (Please note that
this source was unavailable for verification at time of publication. Eds.).
17. At the second AIDS Forum, held in Denver in 1983, a group of men and women with
AIDS and ARC (AIDS Related Complex) condemned the use of the words "AIDS victim" to
describe their condition. In an act of self-acclaim, this group announced the moniker "Person
with AIDS" or "PWA" as a more empowered naming of the condition. Grover, supra note 5,
at 26-27.
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lives, members of communities with a high risk of AIDS have organized
actively to protest FDA policies and procedures by demonstrations at
AIDS colloquia worldwide and by participating in civil disobedience at
the national level."8 Such communities claim that the twelve year cycle
which is common to complete the FDA approval method is effectively
killing many PWAs who only have but a two year time frame in which to
access drugs which may halt the progress of their disease.19 Addition-
ally, AIDS activists are offended by the use of the double blind placebo
method on humans. They claim the FDA has adopted a fundamentally
inhumane testing methodology that is morally flawed by its "game of
chance" character."
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that no person shall be deprived
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.21 This Essay will
first argue that the government, through the FDA, deprives PWAs of
their interests in life and liberty by precluding them from obtaining life-
extending drugs or by coercing them to participate in placebo studies.
Second, this Essay will propose additional, substitute procedures that
would both safeguard PWAs' interests in life and liberty and streamline
the drug testing process. Third, this Essay will illustrate how the federal
government's interest in protecting the public from unsafe or ineffective
drugs would remain qualitatively unaffected by such alternative proce-
dures. In conclusion, this Essay will recommend the abandonment of the
strict double blind placebo method and the substitution of a far more
humane and ethical procedure for assuring the safety and efficacy of new
drugs.
I. Short History of AIDS in the United States
In 1983, Robert Gallo in the United States and Luc Montagnier in
France each isolated the retrovirus responsible for the immune dysfunc-
tion presented by PWAs.22 While the virus was known as HTLV-III
(Human T-cell Leukemia/Lymphoma Virus III) in the United States
and LAV (Lymphadenopathy-Associated Virus) in France, the virus in
each case was the same.23 Finally, in 1986, a subcommittee of the Inter-
national Committee on the Taxonomy of Viruses agreed to call the new
retrovirus HIV or Human Immunodeficiency Virus.24
18. Bordowitz, Picture a Coalition, in AIDS: CULTURAL ANALYSIS/CULTURAL ACTIv-
ISM, supra note 5, at 183.
19. TREATMENT DECIsIONS, supra note 16, at 183.
20. Bordowitz, supra note 18, at 183; Letter to the Editor from Jesse C. Dobson, ACT-
UP/ San Francisco, San Francisco Bay Times, Dec. 1989, at 3, col 2.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
22. E. NICHOLS, supra note 13, at 95-102.
23. Id.
24. Id at 105.
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Until 1985, AIDS remained largely identified as a "gay disease."
Ironically, when Rock Hudson, screen idol of the 1950s, revealed his
AIDS diagnosis, mainstream America awakened to the possibility that
the disease could infect individuals beyond the high risk community of
urban gay men.25 Beginning in 1986, dissemination of safer sex literature
began in mainstream communities at the recommendation of Surgeon
General C. Everett Koop."6
By November 1989, 115,158 persons in the United States were diag-
nosed with AIDS. Of those persons, 68,441 died due to advanced op-
portunistic infection. 7 AZT, or azidothymidine, remains the only FDA-
approved treatment for HIV infection. 28 While helpful in prolonging
life, AZT has not proven to be extraordinarily beneficial. 29 Although
safer sex literature has been sent to every household in America, and
newer therapies are being discovered, the number of people who will be
diagnosed with AIDS is expected to double by the beginning of 1992.30
II. Overview of the FDA's New Drug Approval Process
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) requires that a
new drug be proven safe and effective before it can be sold to the public.31
In compliance with the FDCA, the FDA has promulgated regulations
outlining the procedures for proving the safety and efficacy of a new
drug.
To introduce into interstate commerce a new drug not yet proven
safe and effective, the drug's proponent must file with the FDA a signed
"Notice of Claimed Investigational Exemption for a New Drug"
(IND).3 2 Before an IND application is approved, the drug company
must produce sufficient evidence to show that the drug is reasonably safe
for introduction into humans for experimental purposes. Furthermore,
the FDA requires the sponsor of the drug to organize and accept ulti-
mate responsibility for meeting all the requirements of the IND
process.33
New drug investigations must follow a three-tiered approach. 4
25. S. GREGORY & B. LEONARDO, supra note 14, at 171; Treichler, supra note 6, at 34,
43.
26. Gray, The AIDS Epidemic: A Prism Distorting Social and Legal Principles, in THE
AIDS EPIDEMIC: PRIVATE RIGHTS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 13, at 227, 247 n.
53; telephone interview with National AIDS Hotline (Jan. 19, 1990).
27. Telephone interview with National AIDS Hotline (Jan. 19, 1990).
28. E. NICHOLS, supra note 13, at 210.
29. See infra notes 41-68 and accompanying text.
30. Telephone interview with National AIDS Hotline (Jan. 19, 1990).
31. 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(d) (1988). The FDCA is codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-93 (1988).
32. 21 C.F.R. § 312.23 (1987).
33. Id. § 312.50.
34. Id. § 312.21; TREATMENT DECISIONS, supra note 16, at 49.
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Phases I and II "determine the clinical pharmacology of a new drug."35
In other words, these stages are designed to test first for the drug's toxic-
ity, preferred route of administration, safe dosage range, and effect on
people with a specific disease. Although data on efficacy is also collected,
it is not the focus of either phase I or phase II. Finally, in phase III, a
new drug is clinically tested to assess its ultimate safety and efficacy.36
The testing method used during phases II and III of the IND pro-
cess is called a double blind placebo study. In such a study, neither the
doctor nor the patient is told whether the patient is using the experimen-
tal drug or a placebo.38 The double blind test is advocated by the FDA
to ensure scientific results with the least amount of uncontrolled vari-
ables.3 9 Double blind studies theoretically protect against any bias a re-
searcher or a participant may have in favor of the drug.4°
HI. Procedural Due Process and the Mathews v. Eldridge
Factors
The Fifth Amendment assures each American that "no person shall
be... deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."41
The meaning of "due process" has eluded scholars and judges alike. The
concept has been subjected to piecemeal academic and judicial interpre-
tation.42 The United States Supreme Court has consistently taken an in-
strumental approach in determining what procedures are due.43 This
approach accords little value to individual dignity, emphasizing the mini-,
mization of the possibility of factual error in the application of substan-
tive rules.' The Court believes that this approach accounts for specific
factual contexts, applying due process safeguards fairly to the particulars
of each situation.45 Thus, due process safeguards that are applicable to
experimental therapies in the AIDS context should be tailored to the exi-
gencies of this health crisis.
The definitive interpretation of procedural due process in the admin-
35. Comment, supra note 14, at 700.
36. Id.; see TREATMENT DECISIONS, supra note 16.
37. 21 C.F.R. § 314.126(b)(2)(i) (1987).
38. TREATMENT DECISIONS, supra note 16, at 49; Comment, supra note 14, at 700.
39. TREATMENT DECISIONS, supra note 16, at 49.
40. Id.
41. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
42. Lecture by W. Ray Forrester, Professor of Constitutional Law, Hastings College of
the Law, San Francisco, Cal. (Nov. 3, 1989).
43. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 714 (2d ed. 1988).
44. Id.
45. Professor Tribe cites three cases in which the Supreme Court has noted the relevance
of specific factual contexts in determining "what process is due": Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471, 481 (1972); Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895
(1961); Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960). See L. TRIBE, supra note 43, at 714.
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istrative context is Mathews." In Mathews, Justice Powell, writing for
the majority, noted that "'due process,' unlike some legal rules, is not a
technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and
circumstances."'47 He continued: "Accordingly, resolution of the issue
whether the administrative procedures provided here are constitutionally
sufficient requires analysis of the governmental and private interests that
are affected."48 Thus, to identify the specific dictates of due process, one
must consider the following three factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government's interest, including the function involved and the fis-
cal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.4 9
In Mathews v. Eldridge, Powell's procedural due process formula
serves "a crude sort of social welfare function."5 0 He weighs and bal-
ances the private interest that is affected against the public interest as
stated by the government. Curiously, the weighing and balancing Powell
promulgates contrasts sharply with the Court's standard mode of decid-
ing whether a procedural due process right is at issue: "as long as a
property [or liberty] deprivation is not de minimis, its gravity is irrele-
vant to the question of whether account must be taken of the due process
clause.""1 This incongruence indicates that the Mathews Court created
an implicit presumption of constitutionality for procedural safeguards
provided by the government.5 2
This presumption dilutes the constitutional protection accorded per-
sons under the Due Process Clause. By presuming a procedure is consti-
tutional, the Court abdicates its responsibility to protect individual
rights.53 During the Constitutional Convention, the Framers decided "to
safeguard certain rights and values, those considered fundamental in a
free society and yet unusually vulnerable to the risk of denial by the ma-
46. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). In Mathews, the Court considered whether a person whose so-
cial security disability benefits had been terminated by the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare (HEW) had been afforded due process. Holding that the HEW procedures did
comport with due process, the Court developed the balancing-of-factors test which remains the
hallmark of due process in the administrative procedure context. See id. at 335.
47. Id at 334 (quoting Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Union, 367 U.S. at 895).
48. Id
49. Id at 335.
50. L. TRIBE, supra note 43, at 715.
51. Id. (citing Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1975)).
52. "[S]ubstantial weight must be given to the good faith judgment of the individuals
charged by Congress with the administration of the social welfare programs that the proce-
dures they have provided assure fair consideration of the entitlement claims of individuals."
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 349; see also L. TRIBE, supra note 43, at 717.
53. L. TRIBE, supra note 43, at 718.
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jority.' '5 4 Protecting such "core" rights precludes "balancing" the gen-
eral interests of the majority against those of the individual." "The
proper role of [the Supreme Court] in this context is to define and protect
those substantive and procedural rights that may not receive their due
respect in the political [majoritarian] process."56 This role of the
Court-to provide additional protection-justifies judicial review of ad-
ministrative procedures to ensure their compliance with constitutional
norms.
57
Although Justice Powell's balancing-of-factors in Mathews v. El-
dridge belies the theoretical function of the Supreme Court in the Ameri-
can constitutional process, its practical effect is to protect most
administrative regulations from constitutional challenge. Thus, to effec-
tuate a change in FDA drug approval methods, one is required to sur-
mount the presumption of constitutionality established in Mathews. This
Essay attempts to rebut this presumption as it applies to the FDA's ap-
proval of new AIDS drugs.
A. Factor One: Life and Liberty Are the Private Interests Affected by
Use of Double Blind Placebo Method
The first factor to be established under a Mathews v. Eldridge chal-
lenge is the existence of a private interest that will be detrimentally af-
fected by official governmental action. 8
The FDA's procedure for approving new drugs constitutes an offi-
cial government action. Congress requires that new drugs that are to be
marketed and sold in interstate commerce be approved by the FDA ac-
cording to outlined administrative regulations.5 9 These regulations man-
date the use of double blind placebo studies to establish the drug's
efficacy.' All new drugs are subject to these regulations, and none are
exempted from them.61 All new drugs are subject to the same standards,
regardless of whether they are new headache medications or treatments
for an incurable disease.62
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id
57. Id.
58. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). The private interest impacted by
official action must fall categorically within life, liberty, or property to trigger the protections
of the Due Process Clause. Id at 332.
59. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1985).
60. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
61. TREATMENT DECISIONS, supra note 16, at 53.
62. Id
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1. The Private Interest of Life
The FDA's use of the double blind placebo method to approve new
drugs deprives PWAs of two private interests, one of which is a private
interest in life. AIDS is caused by a strain of retrovirus for which there is
no cure or reliable therapy." Thus far, over 60,000 lives have been lost
to the scourge of AIDS.6 AZT, the only approved drug or therapy for
HIV infection,"5 cannot be used by many PWAs because of its serious
toxic side effects, such as bone marrow suppression, anemia, neutropenia,
leukopenia, nausea, rash, and confusion. 6  Additionally, AZT is incom-
patible with other anti-viral drugs, such as Ganciclovir, which is pre-
scribed for persons suffering from CMV retinitis, 67 an opportunistic
infection attacking the retina and causing blindness. Thus, AZT is un-
available to many people needing these other treatment modalities.
Scientists believe AZT loses its effectiveness against HIV after only six
months to a year and a half for those who take the drug. 8
Unlike the availability and effectiveness of radiation and chemother-
apy for cancer patients, no lifesaving treatments exist for AIDS. Because
of this dearth of livesaving therapies and the limited applicability of
AZT, most PWAs remain untreated for HIV. Thus, the rationale
adopted by the Court in United States v. Rutherford69 is inapplicable in
the AIDS context. Rutherford is the leading Supreme Court case in the
area of experimental drugs. The Rutherford Court refused to exempt
Laetrile from FDA approval process because it feared cancer patients
would rely upon unproven Laetrile therapy in lieu of conventional life-
saving treatments. Because the PWA has few, if any, possible treatments
for his or her disease, reliance upon Rutherford in the AIDS drug context
would be both injudicious and premature.
The only possibility for life rests with private development of new
drugs. All drugs are subjected to double blind placebo studies.
Although FDA regulations are not directly responsible for an individ-
ual's HIV infection, they contribute indirectly to the progress of the dis-
ease. Double blind placebo studies are lengthy, narrow, frequently
discriminatory, and prone to bias.70 They exacerbate the fatal quality of
AIDS because they alone allow access to treatment that may extend life.
63. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
64. See supra note 10. In 1989, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) predicted that
AIDS would increase to be the third or fourth leading cause of premature death in the United
States by 1991. E. NICHOLS, supra note 13, at 20.
65. E. NICHOLS, supra note 13, at 210.
66. TREATMENT DECIsIoNs, supra note 16, at 7-8; Baker, AZT Update, BETA, Nov.
1989, at 22-23.
67. Thalson, Brief Notes, BETA, Nov. 1989, at 28.
68. Baker, supra note 66, at 12.
69. 442 U.S. 544 (1979).
70. See TREATMENT DECISIONS, supra note 16, at 49, 58-63.
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When participation in double blind placebo studies is denied due to sex,
race, age, health condition, or economic support,71 the possibility of ex-
tended life is also denied to those individuals. Double blind placebo stud-
ies limit participation to a numbered few and deny the potential for life to
all others who are not allowed to participate. Generations of PWAs will
die while double blind placebo studies, which require up to twelve years
before sufficient data are generated and compiled, await FDA approval.
Professor Laurence Tribe affirms the notion that not only official
action, buL also official inaction, may impact one's private interest in life:
Emerging notions that government has an affirmative obligation
somehow to provide at least a minimally decent subsistence with
respect to the most basic human needs, subject to all of the familiar
difficulties with judicial enforcement of affirmative duties, thus fit
quite naturally into a conception of bodily integrity in which a gov-
ernmental omission can be as deadly as the most pointed of gov-
ernmental acts.72
Official action via FDA drug approval regulations profoundly impacts a
PWA's interest in life. A PWA may lose his or her life as a result of the
FDA interposing itself between the helpful drug and the desperate un-
treated patient. Ovid long ago realized the importance of the early treat-
ment of disease: "Too late is the medicine prepared when the disease had
gained strength by long delay."73
To argue that due process need not be afforded to PWAs because the
governmental action is not directly responsible for HIV infection, ignores
the direct involvement of the FDA in the onslaught of AIDS. In utiliz-
ing the double blind placebo method, the FDA delays dissemination of
helpful drugs and therapies to sick people.74
In Estelle v. Gamble,75 a case concerning the availability of medical
care to prisoners, Justice Stevens correctly insisted that "[w]hether the
71. Id.; Long, Enrollment and Demographic Representation In Clinical Trials: Problems
To Be Solved (Dec. 5, 1989) (written testimony presented to National Institute of Health
AIDS Program Study, Committee of the Institute of Medicine, The National Academy of
Science).
72. L. TRIBE, supra note 43, at 1336.
73. OVID, REMEDIORIUM AMORIS 1.91 (c. 1 B.C.).
74. But physical violation need not be of the "rape, murder, fire and sword" variety
characterized by the "sudden forceful, and perhaps unexpected infliction of painful
physical injury upon an unwilling victim.... Where muggings and violent demon-
strations are the fear and the theorists speak for the fearful, vigorous direct actions
will seem the most important features of violence. Where the streets are quiet, but
people who could be saved are left to die of neglect or cold or hunger, or are crippled
or killed by their living or working conditions, a different group of people may suffer,
and other theorists may see their suffering as attributable to human agency, and so
class it as part of man's violence to man."
L. TRIBE, supra note 43, at 1335 (quoting Harris, The Marxist Conception of Violence, 3 PHIL.
& PUB. AFF. 192, 215, 219 (1974)).
75. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
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[poor] conditions [of the prison] were the product of design, negligence,
or mere poverty, they were cruel and inhuman.17 6 He concluded that
governmental indifference to a prisoner's medical needs violates the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.7 7 Likewise, Justice Brennan, dis-
senting in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Serv-
ices,78 noted that "if a State cuts off private sources of aid itself, it cannot
wash its hands of the harm that results from its inaction. '79 Thus, cer-
tain Supreme Court Justices have acknowledged that governmental inac-
tion can wrongfully deprive people of their life and liberty by denying
them the protection of due process.
2. The Private Interest of Liberty
The second private interest that is affected by the FDA's methods
for approving drugs is a liberty interest. PWAs have a fundamental right
to liberty, derived from the right of privacy, to choose for themselves
treatment with unapproved experimental drugs. This Essay will not ex-
plore the PWA's right to privacy in choosing medical treatment. This
proposition has been argued persuasively elsewhere."0 I only posit that
PWAs do have this right. Almost one hundred years ago, the Court
opined that "[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded,
by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession
and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of
others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.""1 The
Court concluded that "[t]he right to one's person may be said to be a
right of complete immunity to be let alone." 2 The FDA's interception
of new AIDS drugs interferes with the possession and control of the
PWA's own body. The PWA's right to his or her person is the right of
access to helpful therapies and drugs.
Professor Tribe perceives one's right to personhood, or the right to
one's own self-realization, as incapable of absolute protection from all
interference by the government.8 3 He notes, however, that where one's
personhood confronts the strong arm of governmental coercion or ne-
glect, it manifests itself as a fundamental right worthy of constitutional
protection.4 In the AIDS context, the FDA drug approval procedure
76. Id. at 116-17 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
77. Id.
78. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
79. Id. at 207 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
80. See Comment, supra note 14; see also State Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Rogers, 387
So. 2d 937 (Fla. 1980) (right of physician to exercise professional judgment to administer non-
hazardous experimental drug).
81. Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
82. IL
83. L. TRIBE, supra note 43, at 1305.
84. IM at 1305-06.
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functions as a strong arm foreclosing PWAs' free exercise of what they
will do with their own bodies. The FDA coerces PWAs to participate in
placebo trials, jeopardizing the lives of participants who receive placebos.
The FDA also neglects PWAs by denying them the new drug they need
to survive. Thus, the FDA action gives rise to a fundamental right wor-
thy of constitutional protection-namely, procedural due process. This
right emanates from a PWA's right to both liberty and personhood.
B. Factor Two: The Double Blind Placebo Method Erroneously
Deprives PWAs of Their Private Interests in Life and
Liberty and the Value of Substitute Procedural
Safeguards is Great
The second factor to be considered in a Mathews v. Eldridge chal-
lenge is "the risk of an erroneous deprivation of [the private] interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional
or substitute procedural safeguards." 5
1. The Risk of an Erroneous Deprivation of Life and Liberty
The FDA's use of the double blind placebo method poses a high risk
for the erroneous deprivation of a PWA's life. Phases II and III of a new
drug investigation constitute a protracted procedure requiring up to
twelve years to complete.8 6 Most of the time required for new drug ap-
proval is primarily dedicated to the double blind placebo study. 7 If an
approval procedure consumes an average of twelve years, at least six
"generations" of PWAs die before access to the helpful drug is allowed. 8
As simple mathematics establishes, hundreds of thousands of lives could
be affected over the course of twelve years.89 Phase I studies collect data
regarding efficacy, while also establishing the level of toxicity. Therefore,
while the double blind placebo study is being administered to a select
group of participants, the drug is known to have certain palliative quali-
85. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
86. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
87. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
88. The projected life expectancy upon a diagnosis with AIDS is eighteen months to two
years. Thus, in twelve years, six "generations" of people will be diagnosed and will die of
AIDS. This is a conservative estimate, assuming no one generation will be diagnosed until the
previous generation has died.
89. In two years, 200,000 additional people will have died from AIDS. If AIDS continues
as it did in the 1980s, the infection rate will grow exponentially. Obviously, this growth rate
would project well over one million people dead by 2002. See Letter from Joel Wiesman,
M.D., Chairman, American Foundation for AIDS Research (AMFAR) to AMFAR support-
ers (January 1990); see also J. JAMES, AIDS TREATMENT NEWS 341 (1989) ("Barring a mira-
cle, hundreds of thousands of people in the United States alone are expected to die of AIDS
over the next several years-and the Federally-controlled research establishment as it is cur-
rently operating will have little impact on this catastrophe.").
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ties. Yet, it is not given to fatally afflicted people who will certainly die
without it.
Although the double blind placebo method is reliable, it requires too
much valuable time and is overly extensive. The FDCA only requires a
reasonable method for testing new drugs.90 The double blind placebo
method is extreme and beyond the congressional mandate for reasonable-
ness. 91 Because the FDA has opted for scientific procedures of the strict-
est order, it has established criteria "often harmful to the people in the
studies" as well as to people afflicted with AIDS outside of the studies.92
This method, far in excess of that needed to establish reasonable safety
and efficacy, is not questioned by "mainstream science which accepts or-
thodox trial methodology as a sacred absolute." 93 As a result, the fastidi-
ous procedures of phase II and phase III testing prove deadly when
thousands are waiting for helpful treatments. Thus, the exigency of
AIDS requires the use of more expedient methods to test for efficacy.
Mainstream science should begin to question whether drugs could
be tested more rapidly using alternative methodologies. The fruit of such
reactive curiosity would be the abandonment of the double blind placebo
method in favor of a more reasonable methodology to be used in these
circumstances.
The FDA's use of the double blind placebo method also erroneously
deprives a PWA of liberty. "'[F]undamental in American jurisprudence
[is the notion] that every human being of adult years and sound mind has
a right to determine what shall be done to his own body.' "91 Under
current FDA regulations, PWAs unable to take AZT and without any
other means with which to attack the HIV must await the completion of
double blind placebo studies before they may be able to receive a drug
that has already proven to be somewhat effective. Ironically, the govern-
ment seeks to protect the PWA by engaging the new drug in a double
blind placebo study.95 Common sense evinces the absurdity that a per-
son with AIDS will be dead long before the FDA allows a new drug to
be dispensed at all. The FDA will have acted to protect PWAs from
deleterious drugs while HIV ravages their bodies.
90. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d)(1) (1985).
91. TREATMENT DECISIONS, supra note 16, at 53-54.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Suenram v. Society of Valley Hospital, 155 N.J. Super. 593, 601-02, 383 A.2d 143, 148
(1977) (quoting Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
95. See Toole v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 704, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398,
409 (1967). But see J. JAMES, supra note 89, at 352 (In 1988, Vice-President George Bush
recommended that for life-threatening disease, phase III testing be eliminated for helpful
drugs. "This phase takes the longest, yet it contributes the least, since the great majority of
drugs which begin phase III are eventually approved.... [and they] have already been proved
safe in phase I, and probably effective in phase II.").
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Analogous to the government protecting its citizens from dangerous
drugs is a state social worker's role in protecting an abused child. The
United States Supreme Court held in 1989 that no due process claim
arose in a case where a social worker did not extricate an abused child
from his abusive father's care.96 This result begs the question of whether
a due process claim arises when a government agent takes the child into
state custody. Two Supreme Court rulings, Youngberg v. Romeo 97 and
Estelle v. Gamble,98 answer this question affirmatively. The Romeo
Court held that an involuntarily committed retarded person has a due
process liberty interest that compels the state "to provide minimally ade-
quate or reasonable training to ensure safety and freedom from undue
restraint." 99 In Gamble, the Court held that broad and idealistic con-
cepts of human dignity, civilized standards, and decency establish the
government's obligation to care for a prisoner who cannot, by reason of
the deprivation of his liberty, care for himself."o
The government role in these cases is clearly analagous to the role of
the FDA in drug approval: the issue is not whether FDA approval regu-
lations constitute a due process violation per se, but whether the FDA's
use of the double blind placebo method in approving new drugs causes a
loss of life and liberty and thus violates due process.
The Court in DeShaney noted that due process is implicated when
"the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an individ-
ual's liberty that it renders him unable to care for himself, and at the
same time fails to provide for his basic human needs--e.g., food, cloth-
ing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety.... ."o The DeShaney
Court continued:
In the.., due process analysis, it is the State's affirmative act of
restraining the individual's freedom to act on his own behalf-
through incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar re-
straint of personal liberty-which is the "deprivation of liberty"
triggering the protections of the Due Process Clause, not its failure
to act to protect his liberty interests against harms inflicted by
other means. 102
In the AIDS drug approval context, the federal government takes PWAs
into its own protective custody by disallowing them access to helpful
drugs. Drug approval protects PWAs from deleterious drugs. 0 3 To dis-
96. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989).
97. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
98. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
99. Romeo, 457 U.S. at 319.
100. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 102-04.
101. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998, 1005-06
(1989).
102. Id. at 1006.
103. See Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398, 409
(1967).
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allow PWAs the freedom to act on their own behalf"° in choosing help-
ful drugs for their treatment is to deprive them of liberty. This
deprivation "trigger[s] the protections of the Due Process Clause."105
Justice Brennan, dissenting in DeShaney, agreed: "I would read
[Romeo] and [Gamble] to stand for the much more generous proposition
that, if a State cuts off private sources of aid and then refuses aid itself, it
cannot wash its hands of the harm that results from its inaction." 106 He
continued: "We have acknowledged that a State's actions-such as the
monopolization of a particular path of relief-may impose upon the State
certain positive duties.... [A] State may be found complicit in an injury
even if it did not create the situation that caused the harm."10 7
Following Brennan's reasoning and the Court's holding in
DeShaney, one may persuasively argue that the government's direct in-
tervention in the dissemination of new drugs is a "monopolization of a
particular path of relief"'10 that makes it "complicit"'' 1 9 in the onslaught
of AIDS. This monopolization is custodial insofar as the approval and
regulation of AIDS drugs seek to protect PWAs from unapproved drugs.
Unapproved drugs are kept in the FDA's custody. Thus, the only relief
is kept in the government's custody. The custodial nature of the govern-
ment's action through the FDA triggers due process protections under
Romeo and Gamble because the PWA is deprived of governmental relief
and is cut off from seeking other relief.
The FDA deprives PWAs of their fundamental liberty interest-the
right to determine what shall be done with their own bodies-and substi-
tutes a system of chance and luck in its place. Double blind placebo
studies are exercises in wagering. Proponents of double blind placebo
studies believe that participation in a new drug study is consensual, in-
formed, and noncoerced.110 They conclude that PWAs do exercise their
right to choose what shall be done with their bodies when they partici-
pate in a double blind placebo study. Although participation in a double
blind placebo study requires the informed consent of the patient, 1 this
consent by a person with AIDS is only ostensibly voluntary. Much like
104. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1006.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1009 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. TREATMENT DECISIONS, supra note 16, at 58.
111. Id. But see Grodin, Kaminow & Sassower, Ethical Issues in AIDS Research, in THE
AIDS EPIDEMIC: PRIVATE RIGHTS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 13, at 222
("[w]hen research involves a dying patient whose body has been ravaged by a continuous series
of recurring infections and the patient is given a glimmer of relief, the consent can hardly be
considered freely given by a nonvulnerable person"); J. JAMES, supra note 89, at 77 (after AZT
had proved effective in the treatment of AIDS, researchers denied AZT to 10,000 people in
order to force several hundred participants to participate in placebo trials).
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the fable of the lady and the tiger, in which a prisoner was forced to
choose between two doors behind which he would either encounter life
with a beautiful woman or death by the attack of a tiger, the choice given
to PWAs is to participate in a game of chance or die. When a PWA does
participate, the "choice" is one that may or may not assure access to the
drug. Under these conditions, access, and thus life, is ultimately deter-
mined by luck.
Modem standards of morality and humanity require the abandon-
ment of the double blind placebo method. The double blind placebo
method requires that PWAs wager their lives to gain access to a helpful
drug. During phases I and II, early signs of a drug's efficacy are deter-
mined while tests for toxicity and safety are run.1 12 AZT is one such
drug that proved beneficial to PWAs during phases I and HI."3 Because
beneficial drugs may reveal themselves during phases I and II, use of the
double blind placebo method to approve such drugs is simply excessive
when many PWAs could clearly benefit from their use. Asking PWAs to
bet their lives that they do not get a sugar pill bears no reasonable rela-
tionship to the protection of the public's health and welfare where toxic-
ity has already been established, efficacy has been proven preliminarily,
and the public health has been safeguarded effectively. Thus, the double
blind placebo method functions as "arbitrary governmental action"
' 1 4
that gambles with a person's life.
Professor Tribe notes that American jurisprudence refuses to coun-
tenance a rule of law that requires a sacrifice by one for the benefit of
many:
[T]hat one person's two good eyes, distributed to two blind neigh-
bors, might yield a net increase in happiness on the theory that one
blind person will experience less misery than two, cannot justify a
governmental decision to compel the exchange. Even if one does
not believe that human sacrifice is never justifiable, courts have
long recognized the wisdom of acting as though persons could
never be used as means to the ends of others, knowing that any
clear departure from that ideal could spell the beginning of a disas-
trous slide. 15
Thus, double blind placebo studies must yield to alternatives that do not
require that PWAs sacrifice their life or liberty for the common good.
112. 21 C.F.R. § 312.21 (1987).
113. TREATMENT DECISIONS, supra note 16, at 31.
114. See Youngberg v. Romero, 457 U.S. 307, 316 (citing Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal
Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 18 (1979)); cf. DeVito v. HEM, Inc., 705 F. Supp. 1076, 1077 (M.D. Pa.
1988) (A person with ARC participated in a double blind study in which he received a pla-
cebo. He soon thereafter progressed to AIDS. The federal district court noted that his pro-
gression to AIDS was "unfortunate.").
115. L. TRiBE, supra note 43, at 1334-35 (emphasis in original).
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The FDA's argument that a PWA has no right to privacy to decide
which drugs to use undermines the federal government's claim that there
is no government deprivation of liberty. The FDA may argue that the
dangers of unapproved drugs require that the government maintain the
integrity of the pharmaceutical drug industry.116 Consequently, this ar-
gument by the FDA substantiates the claim of PWAs that their right to
privacy-the right to decide which drugs to use-exists and is deprived
insofar as the government acts to protect its citizens from the dangers of
unapproved drugs.
2. Value of Additional or Substitute Safeguards
Health care professionals who are involved in the testing of new
drugs for AIDS treatment believe alternatives to double blind placebo
studies could assure the protection of the public health and streamline
the testing process.
a. Crossover Method
Health care professionals have suggested a modified application of
the double blind placebo method to minimize the luck element inherent
in a double blind study and enhance the collection of reliable data.
117
This modification is called the crossover method.11 s The crossover
method first splits the participant pool in half. One half of the pool re-
ceives the drug while the other half receives a placebo.119 Midway
through the study, the half receiving the placebo is switched to the drug
and vice versa. Thus, at the conclusion of a study using the crossover
method, all the participants in the pool have received both a placebo and
the drug. 120
Under the crossover method, the study lasts for the same duration
as a double blind study. The crossover method displaces the "lady and
tiger" element inherent in a double blind placebo study by distributing
the drug to all participants. The crossover method has great potential as
an alternative to double blind studies because the data collected from a
study using the crossover method is reasonably reliable in comparison to
that collected from a double blind study.1 21
b. Treatment IND Method
The Treatment IND is a procedure for moving promising drugs
116. See, eg., Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, 412 U.S. 609 (1973).
117. Interview with Ed Freeman, nurse practitioner who conducts studies for the HIV
Institute at Davies Medical Center, San Francisco, Cal. (Dec. 11, 1989).
118. Id
119. IA
120. Id.
121. Id.
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through the FDA pipeline at an accelerated pace. 12 2 In order for a drug
to be considered for distribution through this program, it must have
completed phase I testing and be supported by evidence of efficacy with
no extreme toxicities. 123 Additionally, the drug must be in the process of
being tested as an agent against a severe or life threatening illness, such
as AIDS. 4 AZT was released in a modified Treatment IND program in
1987.125
Drugs are not usually considered for Treatment IND status until
mid to late phase II testing. 126 In a Treatment IND protocol, the indi-
vidual's private physician registers with the manufacturer, obtains and
dispenses the drug, and agrees to collect data and meet other require-
ments imposed by the manufacturer.127 These requirements, as well as
the number of participants, will vary for each drug accepted into the
program. It must be stressed that policies and procedures pertaining to
Treatment IND are still in flux. The program is subject to change, and
the future of Treatment IND will depend largely on how well it works
with the approval of the drug dideozyinosine (ddI). 12 8
The drug ddI is one of a group of promising anti-HIV drugs called
nucleoside analogues.12 9 Like AZT, it works by inhibiting the replication
of HIV in the cell, thereby reducing the rate at which cells become in-
fected with the virus.130 Treatment IND protocol makes ddI available to
PWAs and people with ARC who have developed an intolerance to
AZT.1 31 Participants must either have a diagnosis of AIDS as defined by
the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) or be HIV positive and sympto-
matic with a T-helper cell count of less than 200.132
122. See Roy, Parallel Track and Treatment IND, BETA, Nov. 1989, at 5; see also E.
NICHOLS, supra note 13, at 199-200.
123. Roy, supra note 122, at 5.
124. Id.
125. ia; see Grodin, Kaminow & Sassower, supra note I 11, at 219 ("AZT has thus proven
to be a paradigm for a reasonable approach to drug testing in AIDS.").
126. Roy, supra note 122, at 5.
127. ia
128. Id.
129. Hafs, ddl, BETA, Nov. 1989, at 1.
130. 1i4
131. Id. at 3. AZT intolerance is defined by any one of several adverse reactions, including
the following: (1) a drop in hemoglobin of at least two grams a month; (2) a drop in the
neutrophil count to less than 750 cells per mm; (3) severe nausea and/or vomiting; (4) severe
headaches that do not respond to analgesics; and (5) declining muscle strength, such as inabil-
ity to climb stairs. Id
132. See id at 3. The CDC assigns an AIDS diagnosis when a person is afflicted with or
more rare infections, such as Pneumocystis pneumonia or Kaposi's Sarcoma, and/or has less
than a 9400 T-helper lymphocyte count. The T-helper cells are counted to determine the
extent of HIV infection, because HIV cripples a human immune system by attacking the T-
helper cells. For the August, 1987 CDC Surveillance Case Definition for Acquired Immu-
nodeficiency Syndrome, see E. NICHOLS, supra note 13, at 278-90.
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Bristol-Myers, the sponsor of ddL, is requiring physicians to provide
considerable data on participants in the ddI Treatment IND protocol.
133
This data includes laboratory evaluations every seven to ten days during
the first two months of ddI therapy.134 The treating physician must re-
port adverse effects of any severity noted during this period to Bristol-
Myers by telephone. 135 If the participant decides to continue on the drug
after the first two months, follow-up laboratory evaluations and adverse
experience report forms must be submitted every ten days. 136 Bristol-
Myers intends to use the laboratory data from this protocol to enhance
data issuing from phase II and phase III trials. 137 Physicians participat-
ing in these trials believe such data will be very helpful in assessing ddl's
efficacy. 138
c. The Open Label Study Regimen
The Open Label Study Regimen, along with Treatment IND proto-
col, is one of two alternative methodologies presently built into nation-
wide ddI protocols. The Open Label Study Regimen is designed for
patients who are experiencing significant deterioration despite AZT
treatment or who are not eligible to enter into phase II clinical trials. 139
Bristol-Myers intends to gather data about ddI using both double blind
placebo studies and the Open Label Study Regimen."4
The Open Label Study Regimen makes ddI available to PWAs who
are "clinically deteriorating" on AZT.141 Participants must have a diag-
nosis of AIDS that conforms to CDC criteria, and their health status
must indicate serious decline as evidenced by certain symptoms. 42
Bristol-Myers is requiring physicians to provide data on participants
in the Open Label Study Regimen as well, including laboratory evalua-
tions. 4 3 As in the ddI Treatment IND protocol, treating physicians
must report to Bristol-Myers, by telephone, any adverse effects noted
during the test period."4 If the participant decides to continue on the
drug after the first two months, follow-up laboratory evaluations and ad-
133. Hafs, supra note 129, at 3.
134. ItL
135. Id.
136. Id
137. Interview with Brian Friedman, M.D., a physician involved with ddI testing through
County Community Consortium, a research and informational association in San Francisco,
Cal. responsible for many clinical trials of AIDS drugs and treatments (Dec. 12, 1989).
138. Id.
139. Hafs, supra note 129, at 3.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id
143. Id
144. Id
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verse experience report forms must be submitted every ten days. 145
d. Parallel Tracking
Dr. Anthony Fauci, Director of the National Institute of Allergy
and Infectious Disease, has proposed Parallel Tracking, which is a sys-
tem for the early release of drugs. 1 If implemented, this program will
make promising drugs available to people who do not qualify for clinical
trials or who have not responded positively to currently approved thera-
pies.147 Drugs under consideration for Parallel Track testing will have
three characteristics in common: (1) completion of phase I and
pharmacokinetic testing; (2) available data on the drug's interactions
with other drugs in common use; and (3) evidence of sufficient efficacy
that warrants wider release of the drug.148 Certain circumstances must
also be present for a drug to qualify for release under Parallel Track.
Drugs that are designed to treat a disease for which no standard treat-
ment is available will be given priority. 49 Under Parallel Track testing,
data is collected and used to test the efficacy of the drug along with data
from double blind placebo testing.1 50
Physicians treating PWAs believe Parallel Track testing will prove
illustrative and reliable as a drug approval method.151 They also believe
alternative methodologies would allow more humane and practical test-
ing than the double blind placebo method.' 52
e. The Benefits of New Approaches
Pressure from AIDS activists and a changing philosophy among
medical researchers have resulted in the development of new approaches
to the testing and distribution of potentially valuable drugs to severely ill
patients who in the past had no alternatives. 53 These approaches cir-
cumvent the government's concern about dangerous drugs entering inter-
state commerce because, under these protocols, orthodox methods for
145. Id.
146. Roy, supra note 122, at 5; see Expanded Availability of Investigational New Drugs
Through a Parallel Track Mechanism for People with AIDS and HIV-Related Disease, 55
Fed. Reg. 20,858 (1990) (proposed Apr. 2, 1990).
147. Roy, supra note 122, at 5.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Interview with Brian Friedman, M.D., supra note 137.
152. Id.
153. See Letter from Keith Haring, artist and PWA, who is active in ACT-UP/New York,
to supporters of ACT-UP (Autumn 1989); see also Cimons, FDA Likely to Relax Rules on
AIDS Drug, San Francisco Chron., Sept. 14, 1989, at E9, col. 5; see generally J. JAMES, supra
note 89, at 277 (David Werdegar, M.D. and San Francisco Director of Health called for faster
clinical trials through community-based trials to reduce death from HIV infection.).
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testing toxicity remain intact before testing for efficacy begins. 54 Thus,
dangerous drugs would be eliminated systematically from these alterna-
tive protocols.
Alternative methods for testing new drugs may also reap greater
data concerning the application of the drug in various demographic
populations.155 Data collected from a broader spectrum can be assessed
and evaluated according to each participant's quality of health. The
double blind placebo method requires that participants be screened ac-
cording to specific narrow criteria."5 6 Thus, data collected from double
blind placebo tests represents a much smaller field of efficacy.15 7 Collect-
ing data from a broader field of participants could result in an informa-
tional windfall.
Concern with uncontrolled variables, such as the prior use of an-
other drug or the placebo effect, may be quelled by compiling detailed
medical history data from each patient who receives a drug. Were drug
approval studies open to more individuals, PWAs would be more honest
about their past medical history. Often, PWAs must lie about their medi-
cal history to qualify for double blind placebo studies.1 58 Data collected
under alternative methodologies could be compared across the broad
spectrum of participants to analyze the effects of the proposed drug.
To safeguard patients from the risk of receiving a placebo, alterna-
tive methodologies could install baseline data from deceased patients
who were not treated with the drug in the past.159 Concern with the
placebo effect-the psychologically enhanced effects of receiving a
drugi ° may be met with a system of distribution that imposes a rigid
standard for physicians who wish to prescribe the drug to their patients.
To minimize the placebo effect, physicians could be trained to warn the
patient that the drug promises no therapeutic potential, and that it is
purely experimental and thus without any proven merit. Such training
must be developed and implemented by experts in psychological testing
and placebo effect. PWAs do compose a well-informed class, keeping one
another educated as to effective treatments. Gossip as to the efficacy of a
drug is bound to develop, enhancing the potential for a placebo effect.
This, however, also occurs in the context of a double blind placebo study.
It is unlikely that such interaction in the alternative context would affect
test results any more than in the placebo context. Furthermore, gossip as
154. See supra notes 123, 139, & 150 and accompanying text.
155. TREATMENT DECISIONS, supra note 16, at 59-60; Long, supra note 71.
156. TREATMENT DECISIONS, supra note 16, at 59-60; J. JAMES, supra note 89, at 380-81
(some trials have such impractical entry criteria that it takes months to recruit even a single
patient).
157. TREATMENT DECISIONS, supra note 16, at 59-60.
158. Id.
159. See supra notes 116 & 133 and accompanying text.
160. TREATMENT DECISIONS, supra note 16, at 59-60.
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to the efficacy of a drug will grow only as the drug proves itself effective.
The possibility of a riot of placebo effect occurring during an alternative
test is unlikely if a new drug is patently ineffective against HIV, and
PWAs are dying in spite of the drug they are receiving.
C. Factor Three: Government's Interest in Substituting Another
Procedure for Testing Drugs is Enhanced
The final factor to be considered in a Mathews v. Eldridge challenge
is the government's interest in alternative procedures. "[I]n a world of
limited resources, society cannot afford wholly to ignore interests other
than those of the individual asserting a denial of 'life, liberty or prop-
erty'.... ,,6 To protect the due process rights of PWAs, the FDA must
abandon its use of the double blind placebo study to approve new drugs
and substitute an alternative methodology. The additional cost to the
government for a substitute procedural safeguard would be minimal.
Although the FDA would be required to find experts who could assess
the data submitted by the pharmaceutical companies using alternative
methodologies, the cost of these experts should be no more than the
FDA currently shoulders in procuring experts to assess double blind pla-
cebo studies. Each new drug must be approved according to a tailored
plan or protocol. Each protocol must be submitted to the FDA by the
pharmaceutical company before trials may begin.1 62 Experts hired to as-
sess the data could develop the individual protocols, wedding their exper-
tise to the specifics of the drug approval plan. Although these proposed
substitute procedures would require some development, the drug manu-
facturer would gladly carry additional costs in the short term-then pass
the additional costs on to consumers after FDA approval of the drug.
Most drug companies are willing to shoulder additional costs because
they want to market their product in interstate commerce as quickly as
possible.1 61 Considerable litigation evinces the industry's frustration
with present protocols and its willingness to underwrite and finance alter-
native methods.' 6
161. L. TRIBE, supra note 43, at 715.
162. 21 C.F.R. § 312.23(a)(6) (1987).
163. Bristol-Myers is distributing ddI free to those eligible under Treatment IND and
Open Label Study Regimen. Hafs, supra note 129, at 3.
164. See, eg., Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, 412 U.S. 609 (1973) (FDA
may deny the new drug application for Lutrexin on grounds that the drug was not within the
grandfather clause of the FDCA); Edison Pharmaceutical Co. v. FDA, 600 F.2d 831, 838-39
(D.C. Cir. 1979) (evidence supported the FDA's conclusion that double blind testing of the
new drug ethically could be performed on noncardiac patients and was necessary before the
drug could be administered to cardiac patients); Cooper Laboratories, Inc. v. Commissioner,
FDA, 501 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (affidavits stating that particular disease for which drug
was marketed as treatment was hard to diagnose, ran variable course, and caused pain did not
create factual question requiring FDA to conduct hearing as to whether testimonials of exper-
ienced physicians, rather than controlled studies, should be recognized as substantial evidence
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The proposed change in procedure actually strengthens the govern-
ment's protection of the public health and welfare. The FDCA is
"designed to protect [the] public as a whole by keeping dangerous and
deleterious products from reaching [the] uninformed consumer." '165 Al-
ternative methods of testing retain orthodox procedures for ascertaining
toxicity and assure the new drug's safety before distributing it to a wider
spectrum of patients. 166 Thus, the government's interest in assuring
safety would remain paramount in the alternative procedures for approv-
ing new drugs. Accordingly, the purpose of the FDCA would be met by
alternative methods of testing.
Wider distribution of unapproved drugs would enhance the govern-
ment's protection of the public health and welfare by prolonging the lives
of hundreds of thousands who are afflicted with HIV infection. Protec-
tion of the public welfare may also be enhanced by alternative testing
methodologies because the compiled data generated by these testing
methodologies may be more comprehensive than that gathered by the
double blind placebo method. 67 Alternative testing methods produce
broad based data, determining efficacy as the new drug is administered to
a variety of persons afflicted with HIV. Such data would be collected
after the drug has been proven safe. Additionally, side effects of the drug
which occur with some rarity will be discovered promptly, because alter-
native procedures would gather greater data from a more diverse pool of
participants.' 68
Prolonged health and life for many PWAs could also result in a
lightened patient load for private and public hospitals that are presently
experiencing a health care capacity crisis due to the epidemic proportion
of HIV patients.I69 Hospitals nationwide are buckling under the load of
HIV patients seeking treatment.170 If this load were lightened, these fa-
cilities could provide better care to catastrophically ill people, be they
PWAs or those with non-HIV ailments.
As potentially helpful drugs become more available, PWAs may not
be as susceptible to abandoning faith in Western medicine for esoteric,
of drug's efficacy); Edison Pharmaceutical Co. v. FDA, 513 F.2d 1063 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (FDA
is required to hold hearing when there is factual question as to whether double blind tests for
new drug approval were too dangerous to perform).
165. Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 704, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398, 409
(1967).
166. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 158-63 and accompanying text.
168. Id.
169. E. NICHOLS, supra note 13, at 200, 259-73; Landers & Seage, Medical Care ofAIDS in
New England, in THE AIDS EPIDEMIC: PRIVATE RIGHTS AND PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note
13, at 257-72; Green, Wintfeld, Singer & Schulman, AIDS and New England Hospitals, in THE
AIDS EPIDEMIC: PRIVATE RIGHTS AND PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 13, at 273-83.
170. E. NICHOLS, supra note 13, at 200, 259-73.
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unproven Eastern or New Age therapies. 171
The development of alternative testing methods for AIDS drugs
paves the way for use of such methods in other contexts.'72 While AIDS
poses an immediate threat, other diseases that may be equally dangerous
to a great many people exist or may be on the horizon. Development and
implementation of alternative testing methods in the AIDS context will
allow medical science and the FDA to expedite palliative treatments for
a variety of other fatal illnesses. Use of alternative testing protocols in
the AIDS context will furnish scientists with data with which they may
tailor testing methods to the diseases and new drugs they may confront.
Alternative testing methods may be used in the AIDS context to provide
a valuable "trial run."' 173
IV. Conclusion
AIDS is a disease that poses a serious threat to public health both in
the United States and worldwide. Its danger is not confined to its lethal
efficiency. Much of what makes AIDS problematic is medical science's
embryonic understanding of viruses generally and retroviruses specifi-
cally. Thus, HIV infection is presently treated with the few drugs and
therapies available in the marketplace. Although these treatments have
proven to be helpful, many PWAs are unable to use these FDA approved
treatments for very long, if at all.
Drugs are being developed to block the progress of AIDS; these
drugs, however, are slow to enter the marketplace. The FDA's method
for approving new drugs bottlenecks the dissemination of newly devel-
oped drugs that are effective in the treatment of AIDS. The double blind
placebo study is the main offender in the FDA's approval procedures. A
double blind placebo study may take twelve years from development to
completion, during which time hundreds of thousands will die of AIDS.
The FDA should abandon its use of double blind placebo studies where a
great loss of life is inevitable.
The Court should recognize a PWA's due process right of access to
new, potentially life-extending drugs. Under the Mathews v. Eldridge74
analysis, PWAs can demonstrate their protected interests in life and lib-
erty and that they are denied these interests by the FDA's use of double
blind placebo studies to approve new drugs. Under Mathews, the PWA
can also produce alternative methods for approving new drugs-each of
171. See TREATMENT DECISIONS, supra note 16, at 50; see also E. NICHOLs, supra note 13,
at 198-99 (PWAs are manufacturing their own remedies in kitchens and basements).
172. TREAMENT DECISIONS, supra note 16, at 75-76.
173. For an insightful and probative essay on the problems with the FDA drug approval
process in the AIDS context, see Pier, The Emperor Has No Clothes: Notes. on AIDS Drug
Testing and Access, in L JAMES, supra note 89, at 354-57.
174. 424 U.S. 319 (1974).
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which functions to disseminate new drugs more quickly and more hu-
manely. These new methods are not substantially more expensive to im-
plement, and rapid dissemination of helpful drugs would lessen the
burden on American hospitals, which are buckling under the weight of
the epidemic. Thus, the FDA should loosen its strict adherence to the
double blind placebo method to prevent the risk of an erroneous depriva-
tion of PWAs' interests in life and liberty. If the FDA were to do so,
either on its own initiative or by court order, hundreds of thousands of
lives may be saved.1 75
Bret L. Lansdale*
175. The statistics provided in this Essay were current at the time of writing. By the time
of publication, however, the number of Americans diagnosed with AIDS had increased to
161,073 and the number of Americans who have died has increased to 100,813. Telephone
interview with Centers for Disease Control (January 30, 1991)(statistics as of December 31,
1990); see supra notes 9 & 10 and accompanying text.
* B.A., Yale University, 1984; Bret was a member of the Third Year Class at the time of
his death on October 21, 1990.
